Prosecutorial Discretion on Trial by Dancer, Mark R.
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION ON TRIAL
MARK R. DANCER
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of criminal cases filed in state courts each year is
staggering. Recent tabulations of criminal filings in state courts
of several and limited jurisdiction for the year of 1981 indicated
a range in the number of cases filed from 1,340 in Montana to
1,316,709 in Texas.' In addition, the estimated number of delin-
quency cases disposed of in the United States by courts ofjuvenle
jurisdiction in 1980 was 1,345,200.2
The total number of criminal cases filed in United States district
courts in 1982 was 31, 623.3 In that same year, 4,767 criminal ap-
peals were filed in federal courts of appeal,4 and 907 petitions for
certiorari to the Supreme Court were filed concerning criminal
cases.5 In response to this flood of cases, pretrial diversion programs
have been implemented in various communities. 6
Pretrial diversion,7 also known as pretrial intervention, is a fairly
new concept in the field of criminal law. Among the many objec-
tives of pretrial diversion is the desire to alleviate congested court
calendars.8 The "early diversion" concept was first attempted in
the mid-1960's and has grown steadily since that date.9 The objec-
1. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP-r OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
1983 474 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK]. The number of criminal cases filed in each state
in 1981 was: Alabama 140,170; Alaska 22,355; Arizona 148,395; Arkansas 147.428; California
923,834; Colorado 59,578; Connecticut 109,539; Delaware 56,822; District of Columbia 36,597;
Florida 447,754; Georgia 45,286; Hawaii 52,537; Idaho 32,632; Illinois 712,379; Indiana 144,960;
Iowa 113.667; Kansas 30.093; Kentucky 217.193; Louisiana 536,856; Maine 96,449; Maryland
171.781; Massachusetts 657,551; Michigan 538,014; Minnesota 114,986; Mississippi not available;
Missouri 148,155; Montana 1,340; Nebraska 173,844; Nevada 52,822; New Hampshire 39,175; New
Jersey 31,719; New Mexico 69,355; New York 1,209,061; North Carolina 487,783; North Dakota
21.719; Ohio 406,403; Oklahoma 267,540; Oregon 149,695; Pennsylvania 745,308; Rhode Island
38,940; South Carolina 469,894; South Dakota 136,471; Tennessee 37,213; Texas 1,316,709; Utah
37,366; Vermont 16.559; Virginia 399,209; Washington 170,557; West Virginia 117,493; Wisconsin
161,645; Wyoming 1,772. These are raw numbers that do not take into account variations in state
reporting procedures.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 492.
4. Id. at 516.
5. Id. at 519.
6. This paper does not purport to provide an In-depth analysis of pretrial diversion, and will not
attempt to make an exhaustive study of the various programs. For an in-depth study of various
city and state programs, see NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER, PORTFOLIO OF DEscRmP-
TIVE PROFILES ON SELECTED PRETRIAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS 1-49 (April 1974).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 11-61.
8. NATIONAL PRETRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER, PRETRIAL INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: AN EVALUATION
o POLICY-RELATED RESEARCH AND POLICYMAKER PERCEPTIONS 12 (Nov. 1974) [hereinafter cited as PRETRIAL
INTERVENTION STRATEGIES].
9. Foreword to NATIONAL PRErRIAL INTERVENTION SERVICE CENTER, MONOGRAPH ON LEGAL ISSUES AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAMS (April 1974).
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tive of this Note is to give the reader a basic understanding of the
concept of pretrial diversion. From this starting point these pro-
grams and their desirability can be studied more closely in the
future.
Specifically, this Note focuses on the use of pretrial diversion pro-
grams, and the statutes that create these programs, as a means
to check what has typically been referred to as the unfettered
discretion of the public prosecutor.10 It will be argued that many
of the benefits expected from pretrial diversion programs have been
lost as a result of the new class of litigation that has been spurred
by expansive judicial interpretation of these programs. Diversion
out of the normal criminal process is being used to create more
litigation, which is precisely what the pretrial diversion programs
sought to avoid by their implementation. Seeking to check the
discretion of the prosecutor, defendants who have not been chosen
by the prosecutor as good candidates for diversion are asserting
a "right" to diversion within a given program or statute.
In order to determine if the benefits of diversion have effectively
been negated by these practices, it is necessary to study the con-
cept of diversion and some of its goals. With this background, a
look at an actual diversion program will develop the practical
aspects of the diversion concept. Next, the specific goals of pretrial
diversion will be outlined, and the role of prosecutorial discretion
in diversion programs will be examined. Finally, a look at the case
law in this field will reveal the manner in which a concept to avoid
litigation has been twisted and manipulated, coming full circle to
a point where it actually spurs more litigation, thus negating much
of its initial value.
II. PRETRIAL DIVERSION
A. Overview
In the broadest sense, diversion refers to any filtering of persons
from the criminal justice system. Diversion in this context has been
practiced for a long time in the United States." Discretion on the
part of the police in regard to decisions to arrest or dismiss, as well
as the considerable discretion of the prosecutor or intake worker
in regard to official or unofficial processing, constitute forms of
diversion.' 2 The term "diversion" has been extended to encom-
10. See Vorenburg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power. 94 HARV. L. Rv. 1521. 1522-23 (1981).
11. CENTER FOR STUDIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH. DIVERSION
FROM THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL INSTITUTE].
12. Id. at 1-2.
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pass a wide range of activities including 1) the repeal of certain
criminal statutes; 2) youth service bureaus; 3) bail review projects
emphasizing release on recognizance; 4) projects to assist judges
in sentencing convicted offenders; 5) programs resulting in
dismissal of criminal charges if the defendant complies with
specified obligations; 6) and traditional criminal justice activities
such as plea bargaining, screening, and the imposition of proba-
tion rather than incarceration. 13
The term "diversion" has been used loosely, depending on the
context of the situation in which it is used. This has resulted in
considerable ambiguity and confusion. At a basic level diversion
can be thought of as a non-criminal disposition of what would other-
wise have been a criminal matter. Thus, diversion has been defined
as
the practice by criminal justice officials -police, prosecutors, and judges
- of channeling out of the criminal process classes of offenders who, as
a consequence of their probable and assumed guilt, could theoretically
be handled by the criminal process... Diversion usually (though not
necessarily or always) means stopping short of conviction, sometimes
short of prosecution or even formal arrest.' 4
As Raymond T. Nimmer has noted, diversion is defined some-
what differently in the Report of the Corrections Task Force of the
National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals:
"Diversion" refers to formally acknowledged... efforts to utilize alter-
natives to... the justice system. To qualify as diversion such efforts must
be undertaken prior to adjudication and after a legally proscribed action
has occurred .... [Dliversion implies halting or suspending formal
criminal or juvenile justice proceedings, against a person who has violated
a statute, in favor of processing through a noncriminal disposition.' s
Nimmer has suggested a good operational definition of diversion:
Diversion ... is the disposition of a criminal complaint without a convic-
tion, the noncriminal disposition being conditioned on either the perfor-
mance of specified obligations by the defendant, or his participation in
counseling or treatment. A diversion program is an enterprise that re-
currently arranges conditional noncriminal dispositions whether or not
they are in fact obtained for all defendants complying with the stated
conditions.16
Although under a broad definition of diversion the process may
take place after trial, 1 7 this paper will be concerned with what has
13. See R. NIMMER, DIVERSION THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVE Fons OF PROSECUTION 11-40 (1974).
14. Brake]. Diversion From the Criminal Process: Informal Discretion, Motivation, and For-
mallzation, 48 DEN. L.J. 211, 213 (1971).
15. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS TASK FORCE REPORT
50 (1973), quoted In Nimmer. supra note 13, at 5.
16. Nimmer, supra note 13, at 5.
17. Nimmer, for example, refers to "diversion" as "the channeling of criminal defendants into
programs that may not involve Incarceration." Id. at 3.
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been termed "pretrial diversion." Pretrial diversion has been de-
fined as follows:
A formalized procedure authorized by legislation, court rule, or most
commonly, by informal prosecutorial consent, whereby persons who are
accused of certain criminal offenses and meet preestablished criteria have
their prosecution suspended for a three month to one year period and
are placed in a community-based rehabilitation program. The rehabilita-
tion program may include counseling, training, and job placement. If con-
ditions of the diversion referral are satisfied, the prosection may be nolle
prossed or the case dismissed; if not, the accused is returned for normal
criminal processing. 1
Pretrial diversion programs are based on the belief that it is not
always wise to pursue formal courtroom prosecution for every
criminal violation. 19 As John A. Robertson has noted,
The subjects of diversion have fallen into two classes: (1) persons charged
with offenses of dubious or controversial criminality, such as drug use,
drunkeness and juvenile status offenses; and (2) persons for whom or-
dinary criminal processing may be dysfunctional, such as domestic
assaulters, misdemeanants and juveniles. For both classes the purpose
is to avoid costly criminal processing of questionable benefit to the in-
dividual and society, while maintaining social controls through services
aimed at altering behavior.20
Variations exist among pretrial diversion programs, but all share
some similarities. For instance, at some point prior to trial or
sentencing, "a predetermined class of arrestees is diverted into
treatment or related services and further prosecution is stayed." 21
Pretrial diversion programs also share similar goals. Two of the
primary goals of pretrial diversion are the early identification and
referral of defendants who are in need of treatment, and the quick
and inexpensive disposition of cases which are more effectively
handled without full criminal disposition. 22
Other goals of pretrial diversion-all interrelated-are also at
work. One such goal is unburdening overloaded court dockets,
thereby conserving scarce judicial resources. Another goal is reduc-
ing the incidence of offender recidivism by providing an alternative
to incarceration. A third goal is "the training and placement of
previously unemployed individuals." 23 Obtaining these goals bene-
fits society as a whole, as well as the individual undergoing the
particular pretrial diversion program.
18. Note, Pretrial Diversion From the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 827 (1974).
19. Annot., 4 A.L.R. 4th 147, 151 (1981).
20. Robertson, Pre-Trial Diversion of Drug Offenders: A Statutory Approach, 52 B.U.L. RaV.
335, 335 (1972).
21. Id. at 339.
22. Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the Criminal Justice System. 60
GEO. L.J. 667, 673 (1972).
23. Note, supra note 18.
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All diversion programs must resolve similar issues. First, a class
of candidates eligible for diversion must be determined. Next, a
mechanism for screening those eligible must be implemented. After
a class of divertees has been determined, a time when diversion
will occur must be set. Other issues that must be resolved include
the type of services performed by those diverted, the terms and
conditions upon which diversion is granted and the consequences
of successful completion of the program.2 4
Many factors influence the decision to divert an individual from
judicial proceedings, including "the nature of the offense, the cir-
cumstances of its commission, the attitude of the victim, and the
character of the accused. ' 25 All programs have formal eligibility
criteria concerning such matters as the residency of the accused,
the age of the accused, and the charge brought against the
accused.2 6 Other common provisions of diversion programs include
restrictions on prior arrests and the requirement of a guilty plea.2 7
With this basic understanding of pretrial diversion programs, it
will be helpful to focus on one particular program.
B. Sample Program - One Program in Ohio
Section 2935.36 of the Ohio Revised Code28 provides for the
establishment of pretrial diversion programs for certain offenders
where the prosecuting attorney is so inclined.2 9 The Ohio statute
24. Robertson, supra note 20, at 339.
25. NATIONAL INsTrruTE. supra note 11, at 1.
26. Note, supra note 18, at 832.
27. Id. at 832-33.
28. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.36 (Page 1982).
29. Specifically § 2935.36 provides:
(A) The prosecuting attorney may establish pretrial diversion programs for adults who are
accused of committing criminal offenses and whom he believes will probably not offend again.
The programs shall be operated pursuant to written standards approved by journal entry
by the presiding judge or, in courts with only one judge, the judge of the court of common
pleas and shall not be applicable to any of the following:
(1) Repeat offenders or dangerous offenders, as defined in section 2929.01 of the Revised
Code;
(2) Persons accused of an offense of violence or of a violation of section 2903.06, 2903.07,
2905.04, 2907.04, 2907.05, 2907.21, 2907.22, 2907.31, 2907.32, 2907.34, 2911.31. 2919.12,
2919.13, 2919.22, 2921.02, 2921.11. 2921.12, 2921.32, 2923.04. or 2923.20 of the Revised
Code, with the exception that the prosecuting attorney may permit persons accused of such
offenses to enter a pre-tria diversion program, if he finds any of the following:
(a) The accused did not cause, threaten, or intend serious physical harm to any person;
(b) The offense was the result of circumstances not likely to recur;
(c) The accused has no history of prior deliquency or criminal activity;
(d) The accused has led a law-abiding life for a substantial time before commission of the
alleged offense;
(e) Substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the alleged offense;
348 JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1:2
is similar to other pretrial diversion statutes 30 in many respects.
The prosecuting attorney is given considerable discretion in
establishing programs and in deciding who is eligible for these pro-
grams. With minor exceptions, the programs are not available to
dangerous or repeat offenders. The accused must knowingly waive
his right to a speedy trial for the period of the diversion. At a
minimum, the victim of the crime must be informed of the intent
of the prosecutor to permit the accused to enter the program. 31
Finally, the prosecuting attorney makes the final determination
of whether the individual has successfully completed the program
and the charges should be dismissed.
One program that has been set up under this statute is the
Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney's Screening and Diversion
Program, in Columbus, Ohio. A recognized objective of this pro-
gram is to reduce the workload of the courts by channeling would-
be criminal defendants who qualify into appropriate community-
based rehabilitation and counseling programs. 32 It is thought that
(3) Persons accused of a violation of Chapter 2925 or 3719 of the Revised Code;
(4) Drug dependent persons or persons in danger of becoming drug dependent persons.
as defined in section 3719.011 [3719.01.11 of the Revised Code. However, this division does
not affect the eligibility of such persons for treatment in lieu of conviction pursuant to sec-
tion 2951.041 [2951.04.1] of the Revised Code.
(B) An accused who enters a diversion program shall:
(1) Waive, in writing and contingent upon his successful completion of the program, his
right to a speedy trial, the preliminary hearing, the time period within which the grand jury
may consider an indictment against him, and arraignment, unless the hearing. indictment.
or arraignment has already occurred;
(2) Agree, in writing, to the tolling while in the program of all periods oflimitation established
by statutes or rules of court, that are applicable to the offense with which he is charged and
to the conditions of the diversion program established by the prosecuting attorney.
(C) The trial court, upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, shall order the release
from confinement of any accused who has agreed to enter a pre-trial diversion program and
shall discharge and release any existing ball and release any sureties on recognizance bond
conditioned upon the accused's compliance with the terms of the diversion program. The
prosecuting attorney shall notify every victim of the crime and the arresting officers of his
intent to permit the accused to enter a pre-trial diversion program. The victim of the crime
and the arresting officers shall have the opportunity to file written objections with the pro-
secuting attorney prior to the commencement of the pre-trial diversion program.
(D) If the accused satisfactorily completes the diversion program, the prosecuting attorney
shall recommend to the trial court that the charges against the accused be dismissed, and
the court shall, upon the recommendation of the prosecuting attorney, dismiss the charges.
If the accused chooses not to enter the prosecuting attorney's diversion program, or if the
accused violates the conditions of the agreement pursuant to which he has been released.
he may be brought to trial upon the charges in the manner provided by law, and the waiver
executed pursuant to division (B)(1) of this section shall be void on the date the accused is
removed from the program for the violation.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.36 (Page 1982).
30. See also FLA. STAT. § 944.025 (1979).
31. The Florida statute provides that the victim must consent to the accused's entrance Into the
diversion program. FLA. STAT. § 944.025(2) (1985).
32. Michael Miller, Prosecuting Attorney, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney's Screening and
Diversion Program (unpublished manuscript).
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"(A) reduction of effort expended in the prosecution of lesser
felonies results in a concomitant increase in time and resources
available for prosecution of the more serious felonies which
threaten public safety or represent manifestations of activities con-
ducted by organized crime." 33
One specific purpose of pretrial diversion is rehabilitation. As a
consequence there is an insistence upon a highly selective program
in which only candidates that show potential for the rehabiliation
are chosen. The benefits of the contemplated diversion must also
be weighed against any possible harm to society resulting from
the abandonment of criminal prosecution.
In the Franklin County program a body called the "Diversion
Unit" initially screens all cases being processed through the
Franklin County Municipal Court. 34 The system has been described
in the following manner:
An analysis by the director of the unit as to the suitability [of the accused]
is initially made on the basis of prior adult record and facts and circum-
stances surrounding the offender. In order to qualify for the program, the
individual who is charged must be an adult, must be a resident of Franklin
County or an adjacent county, must have no prior felony conviction or
pattern of adult or juvenile criminal behavior, must voluntarily consent
to the program and the conditions established by the unit, and must waive
certain rights. Once an initial determination is made, further follow-up
is conducted through attendance at the defendant's preliminary hearing,
where contact can be made, prior to the hearing, with representatives
of the arresting agency, the victim of the crime, the defendant, and
his attorney.35
Potential candidates for pretrial diversion are referred by many
sources, including "a Pre-Trial Release Program, the Public De-
fender Society, private counsel, and law enforcement agencies." 36
A record check is then performed, and a conference is held with
the law enforcement detective and counsel to determine the suit-
ability of the individual for diversion. 37 The defendant also com-
pletes a comprehensive application form that contains informa-
tion such as "present and past residences, history of arrests, educa-
tion, history of employment, military record, economic data, reli-
gious preference, family background, and a description of the
events which led to the charge by the police." 3 Attorneys are
welcome to attend conferences at all stages.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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Before final acceptance into the diversion program is granted,
consent must be given by the police and victim.39 At this time the
defendant must waive any rights to a speedy trial and must enter
into two agreements with the Diversion Unit. One agreement con-
tains several rules governing the conduct of the defendant while
in the pretrial diversion program, and the other provides guidelines
that the defendant must meet to successfully complete the
program. 40
A follow-up by the Diversion Unit ensures that the conditions
of the agreement are being met. This is conducted by the individual
reporting at specific times to the unit, and by announced and un-
announced visits to the individual's home and workplace to check
on the progress of the individual. Program duration ranges from
six months to two years. 41
III. GOALS OF PRETRIAL DIVERSION
A. The Victim
The victim's sentiment may represent the strongest argument
against a pretrial diversion program. Although there has been no
study ascertaining the opinions of victims concerning their feel-
ings about the diversion of the would-be defendant in their par-
ticular case, a less than ecstatic response by the victim would not
be surprising. However, the fact that many programs call for the
consent of the victim before implementation, 42 lends support to
an argument that the victim should not feel harmed by the pro-
gram. This is especially true when the statute requires that the
defendant pay restitution to the victim. In effect, the victim is com-
pensated for the injury caused by the defendant.
B. The Defendant
The provisions of a typical pretrial diversion program, providing
for dismissal of the criminal charges brought against the defen-
dant after successful completion of the diversion program, seek
to limit the stigma of criminalization for offenders who have sought
treatment.43 The stigma of going through the criminal process can
limit the future social and economic opportunities of the accused,
or cause the accused to undertake a deviant role, leading to fur-
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. In this respect the Ohio statute is representative.
43. Robertson. supra note 20, at 362-63.
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ther antisocial acts.44 Pretrial diversion also allows the defendant
to avoid "the legal fees as well as the time and publicity attached
to a criminal trial."
45
The National Pretrial Intervention Service Center outlines eight
objectives of pretrial intervention programs designed to benefit the
alleged criminal offender:
1. Improve the economic position of the unemployed and under-
employed through (i increased steady employment, (ii) increased
earnings, (iii) upgrading in skill level and/or job position, and (iv)
greater job satisfaction.
2. Increase the accessibility of adequate employment through (i) in-
creased academic and vocational skills, (ii) improved work habits,
and (iii) job placement.
3. Maintain the employment of those tenuously employed.
4. Increase the capacity to handle family and personal problems
through knowledge and use of appropriate community resources
made accessible by the program.
5. Avoid the delinquent or criminal label and alleviate the negative
social and economic consequences attached to it.
6. Decrease recidivism and other forms of antisocial behavior.
7. Learn to use leisure time productively.
8. For juveniles, increase their readiness to participate in the adult
working world.46
A rehabilitative focus can be seen in the above stated objectives.
This focus on rehabilitation is at the very heart of all pretrial diver-
sion programs.
C. The Criminal Justice System
The National Pretrial Intervention Service Center has also pro-
ferred a list of objectives of pretrial intervention programs that pur-
portedly benefit the criminal justice system:
1. Increase the alternatives available to the court for differential case
processing.
2. Alleviate congested court calendars and increase flexibility in case
processing through reduction in the number of individuals
processed initially as recidivists.
3. Decrease the use of institutional correctional facilities resulting in
the increased capacities of such institutions to adequately serve
incarcerated individuals.
4. Increase the quantity and quality of the information base used for
decision-making in court.
5. Reduce the costs associated with case processing, prosecution, trial,
incarceration, probation and parole through a reduction in the
number of individuals processed initially or as repeaters.
44. NATIONAL INSTITUTE, supra note 11, at 1.
45. Note, Guilty Until Proven Innocent- Pretrial Diversion and Retroactive Criminal Status -
The Constitutionality of the 1982 Massachusetts Drunk Driving Law, 19 NEw ENG. L. REV. 377,
379 (1984) (footnote omitted).
46. PRETRIAL INTERVENTION STRATEGIES, supra note 8. at 12.
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6. Bring the concept of accountability for services into the criminal
justice system.
7. Improve the public image of the criminal justice process through
demonstrating a concern for rehabilitation.47
D. The Community
Likewise, the National Pretrial Intervention Service Center has
extended a list of benefits to the community arising out of pretrial
diversion programs:
1. Reduce recidivism and future anti-social behavior of those accus-
ed of criminal offenses.
2. Increase economic productivity through increases in employment,
skills, wages, and motivation.
3. Create new careers and provide para-professional training for in-
digenous community members and ex-offenders who become staff
members.
4. Decrease the reliance of the accused and his family on costly sup-
portive services.
5. Mobilize and coordinate the work of various community supportive
services; uncover needed but unavailable services.
6. Develop a manpower market for individuals facing substantial
barriers to employment.
7. Increase the participation of the economic community in social
programs. 48
Buttressing these specific goals of pretrial diversion programs
is a growing feeling that there has been a general tendency in this
country to rely too heavily on the law and legal process for the solu-
tion of social problems. 49 Pretrial diversion is one step toward a
solution to the problem of so-called "overcriminalization."
E. The Prosecutor
Little attention has been given to the role of the prosecutor in
pretrial diversion schemes. The Ohio program is illustrative of the
fact that it is common in pretrial diversion programs to give great
discretion to the prosecutor. Often the prosecutor must bring the
application concerning possible candidates for diversion to the
court and has the final decision concerning who enters the pro-
gram. The unfettered nature of prosecutorial discretion is certainly
nothing new and literature on the subject is abundant.50 Recently,
alleged criminal offenders have sought to check this prosecutorial
discretion by asserting a "right" to pretrial diversion under given
programs and statutes in particular jurisdictions under given pro-
grams and statutes in particular jurisdictions. Before further anal-
ysis of this problem, however, a brief discussion of prosecutorial
discretion is in order.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. NATIONAL INSTITUTE, supra note 11. at 3.
50. See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1:2352
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
IV. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A. The Nature of Prosecutorial Discretion
The dominant role of the public prosecutor in the American
system of criminal justice has received great attention and can-
not be doubted.51 The prosecutor decides what offense to charge,
how many offenses to charge, whether the evidence will support
a conviction, what statutes will be enforced and how vehemently
they will be enforced, what restitution will be adequate to the vic-
tim, whether to plea bargain, what will be an acceptable result of
plea bargaining, and numerous other questions. Abraham S. Gold-
stein describes the role of the public prosecutor in the following
manner:
In short, the prosecutor establishes enforcement priorities and accom-
modates conflicting statutory, correctional, and constitutional objectives.
At the same time, he individualizes justice, induces cooperation, and
mitigates the severity of the criminal law. His instruments for achieving
these remarkably diverse objectives are his exclusive authority to initiate
a criminal charge, his power to dismiss or reduce charges, and his over-
whelmingly dominant role in plea bargaining.5 2
James Vorenburg argues that while important reforms in
criminal justice have been made in recent years to limit the exer-
cise of the prosecutor's discretionary power in general, pro-
secutorial powers in fact have been expanded.53 Vorenburg notes
that "[T]here is a broad and rather casual acceptance of the fact
that prosecutors often exercise greater control over the administra-
tion of criminal justice than do other officials." 54 Vorenburg con-
cludes that prosecutorial discretion is virtually unchecked and is
inconsistent with fair and effective administration ofjustice. Voren-
burg defines "discretion" as "the ability to make decisions about
guilt and degree of punishment wihout the limits of rules or other
constraints on freedom of action, including judicial review generally
imposed on other public officials making decisions of comparable
import." 55
Goldstein argues that the monopoly power- given to the public
prosecutor to criminally charge has accentuated the alienation
typically felt by victims of crime.5 6 Goldstein argues that the vic-
51. See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIE JuDICIARY: PRosEctrrORAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY
PLEA (1981) (Goldstein provides a thorough discussion of the powers of the prosecutor.)
52. Id. at 3-4.
53. Vorenburg, supra note 10, passim.
54. Id. at 1522.
55. Id. at 1523-24 (footnote omitted).
56. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515,
518-20 (1982)
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tim plays a secondary role, reporting crimes to public officials and
leaving it to their discretion to prosecute the offenders. As Gold-
stein puts it, the victim is "in a sense represented by the district
attorney, but if his interest in pressing the charge comes into con-
flict with the prosecutor's conception of the public interest, the
latter will prevail." ,57 Here again, the pervasive discretionary power
of the prosecutor cannot be overstated.
B. The Mechanics of Prosecutorial Discretion
The hub of the prosecutor's discretionary power is the power to
charge, plea bargain, and initiate investigations. 58 Overcrowded
dockets create a scarcity of time and resources, and the pro-
secutorial power to charge or not to charge takes on a greater
significance.
Almost total insulation from judicial review further strengthens
the prosecutor's position. This insulation has its roots in the writ
of nolle prosequi.5 9 Moreover, Goldstein argues, that when courts
were starting not to routinely endorse the prosecutor's motions
to dismiss, "the separations of powers doctrine entered on the scene
and introduced a new sense of constitutional constraint about
judicial inquiry into the prosecutor's actions.''60
Though more of an explanation of the precise nature and manner
of prosecutorial discretion and power could be undertaken, 61 a
general idea of the virtually unchecked discretion of the public pro-
secutor is sufficient for the purpose of this Note. Given this wide
use of discretionary power, it is not surprising that there have been
recent attempts to check this power by the implementation of
various statutes and diversion programs authorized by those stat-
utes. An unexpected result has been alleged offenders, who have
been denied pretrial diversion as a result of a prosecutorial deci-
sion, asserting that they have a "right" to diversion. Thus, the very
pretrial diversion programs and statutes setting up these programs,
which were designed to reduce litigation by diverting cases out of
the courts, have been the source of new litigation.
57. Id. at 519.
58. Vorenburg, supra note 10, at 1524.
59. Goldstein. supra note 51, at 12.
60. Id. at 24.
61. See Vorenburg. supra note 10, for a detailed discussion analyzing how prosecutorial discre-
tion to charge Is translated into power by the prosecutor which is virtually unchecked.
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V. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION ON TRIAL
A. Recent Cases
Cases alleging that a failure to divert constitutes an abuse of pros-
ecutorial discretion are few. As more and more diversion programs
are instituted, however, it seems probable that there will be an in-
crease in the number of individuals using these programs, and the
statutes under which the programs are implemented, as a means
of checking the discretion of the prosecutor. The anomolous result
will be an increase in litigation resulting from statutes and pro-
grams that were designed to avoid litigation. Indeed, the anomoly
has begun.62
In State v. Hammersley,63 the defendant was arrested for steal-
ing four hubcaps valued at approximately $300.00. The defendant
petitioned the trial court for a writ of certiorari, alleging that the
failure to divert under the pretrial diversion statute64 constituted
an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. The trial court denied the peti-
tion and on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals the decision
was reversed. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the failure
of the district attorney general to consider the defendant's personal
eligibility for pretrial diversion was an improper application of local
policy contrary to or different from that provided by state law.65
The court went on to rule that before a reviewing court can find
an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, the record must show an
absense of any substantial evidence to support such a refusal.66
Further, the action of the prosecutor is presumptively correct and
should be set aside only on the basis of patent or gross abuse. The
court cited Pace v. State67 for the proposition that the discretion
of the prosecutor is not unbridled and must be exercised to serve
the interests ofjustice, and to that end, is subject to review by the
trial court upon proper application by the defendant. 68
62. The bulk of litigation in this area has occurred in Tennessee and Florida. Although a smat-
tering of cases can be found in other jurisdictions, a look at the case law in Tennessee and Florida,
as well as Ohio. will suffice for purposes of this Note.
63. 650 S.W.2d 352 (Tenn. 1983).
64. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-15-101 to 40-15-106 (1982). This statute specifically provides:
The defendant shall have a right to petition for a writ of certiorari to the trial court for an
abuse of prosecutorial discretion. If the trial court finds that the prosecuting attorney has
abused his discretion in failing to divert, the trial court may order the prosecuting attorney
to place the defendant in a diversion status on such terms and conditions as the trial court
may order.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-15-105(b)(3).
65. State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2nd 352. 356 (Tenn. 1983).
66. Id.
67. 566 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1978); note that in this case the constitutionality of the
Tennessee diversion statute was upheld.
68. State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d 352, 353 (Tenn. 1983).
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Earlier cases in Tennessee indicate that the state's supreme court
was not breaking any new ground in State v. Hammersley. In one
case,6 9 the defendant was indicted for driving under the influence
of an intoxicant. It was his first offense. He sought participation
in a pretrial diversion program under the appropriate statute, but
the prosecutor "refused to enter a memorandum of understanding
on the grounds that the statute (was) unconstitutional, that there
(were) no facilities for diversion in his circuit, that the diversion
statute (was) inapplicable to the D.U.I. statute because the latter
statute contain(ed) a recidivist provision, and finally, because he
personally disagreed with the concept of pretrial diversion." 70 The
court held that the diversion statute was constitutional, 7 1 and
stated that the district attorney may not decline to enter a memo-
randum of understanding for "lack of facilities." 72 Furthermore,
the district attorney's refusal to enter a memorandum of under-
standing because he personally disagreed with the concept of pre-
trial diversion constituted a clear abuse of discretion. 73 The court
also held that the nature of the offense of driving under the in-
fluence of an intoxicant was not a sufficient basis for the denial
of an opportunity to participate in the diversion program. 74 Finally,
the court held that cases involving driving under the influence of
an intoxicant are not exempted from the operation of the diver-
sion statute merely because there is a recidivist provision applicable
to subsequent D.U.I. convictions. 75
Similarly, in State v. Poplar,76 the court held that the district
attorney general abused his discretion when he refused to enter
into a diversion agreement with a defendant indicted for only one
offense to which he admitted his guilt. The defendant was twenty-
three years of age and employed, was supporting his own family
and assisting in the support of disabled parents, and was purchas-
ing a home upon which he was making regular mortgage
payments. 77 However, in the same case, the court held that the
district attorney general acted within his discretionary power when
69. Blackwell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
70. Id. at 833.
71. Id. (citing Pace v. State, 566 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tenn. 1978)).
72. Blackwell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (citing Dearborne v. State,
575 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tenn. 1978)).
73. Blackwell v. State, 605 S.W.2d 832, 833-34 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
74. Id. at 834.
75. Id.
76. 612 S.W.2d 498 (Tenn, Crim. App. 1980).
77. Id. at 501.
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he refused to enter into a diversion agreement with a defendant
who had committed two felonies and had a social history no bet-
ter than that of an average citizen. 78
In another case,79 the defendant was charged with false pretense,
conspiracy to commit false pretense, and defrauding the county
highway department by presenting false weight tickets. The defen-
dant had no prior criminal record and was a reputable person.80
Nonetheless, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals held that
the district attorney did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial
diversion to the defendant. The court reasoned that the criminal
activity was extensive, was not impulsive but required considerable
effort and planning, and was a serious problem in the circuit that
was in need of deterrence.8 1
In a recent case decided by the Tennessee Court of Criminal
Appeals, 2 the court upheld the trial court's decision that the dis-
trict attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying pre-
trial diversion to a defendant who had unlawfully concealed a stolen
automobile and altered its serial number. Though this decision did
not retreat from earlier decisions, the court did note that the nature
and circumstances of a crime may, in themselves, justify denial
of pretrial diversion. 83
In yet another recent case decided by the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals, 84 the court again upheld the discretion of the
district attorney general in denying the defendant's application for
pretrial diversion. In State v. Lovvorn the court held that it was
not necessary for the district attorney to be informed of the defen-
dant's social history or background when pretrial diversion was
denied because of the circumstances of the offense.8 5 The court
cited Holland for the proposition that the fact that the crime "in-
volved deception and deceit and was not a crime of impulse" is
a valid reason for refusing diversion.86 Finally, the court in Lovvorn
interpreted Hammersley to mean that each local district attorney
general's office is not required to formulate and maintain specific
78. Id.
79. State v. Holland, 661 S.W.2d 91, 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
80. Id. at 92.
81. Id. at 93.
82. State v. Sutton, 668 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).
83. Id. at 680. The court cited State v. Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tenn. 1983) as authori-
ty for this proposition.
84. State v. Lovvorn, 691 S.W.2d 574 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).
85. Id. at 575-76
86. Id, at 577 (citing.State v. Holland, 661 S.W.2nd 678 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983)).
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guidelines establishing "public policy considerations" upon which
pretrial diversion will be granted. Indeed, the district attorney
general cannot "create local policy contrary to or different from
that fixed by the legislature for the entire state.' '87
Lovvorn is significant because it interprets both the applicable
pretrial diversion statute88 and the Hammersley decision in a way
that is favorable to the district attorney. The appellant-defendant
had argued that it was an abuse of the district attorney's discre-
tion to not conduct a pretrial investigation pursuant to Tenn. Code
Ann. § 40-15-104(a), which provides in part as follows:
Upon stipulation of the parties, the trial court by order may direct any
county or municipal, or authorized private agency, available for this pur-
pose, or the state department of correction if no local agency is available to
conduct an investigation of the defendant's background. (emphasis added).
The court interpreted this part of the statute to mean that it is within
the court's discretion to order the investigation, and that it was not
necessary that the district attorney be informed of the defendant's
social history or background inasmuch as the denial of pretrial diver-
sion was based on other factors.8 9
The appellant-defendant's second argument was that the decision
of the district attorney general to deny pretrial diversion was an abuse
of discretion because it was based on the prosecutor's individual policy
considerations and not on "established objective standards." 90 The
court, citing Hammersley, held that the "objective standards" needed
to guide district attorney generals should not be created by the district
attorneys themselves, but should be fixed by the legislature for the
entire state.91 At first glance, this holding might be construed to
diminish the discretionary power of the district attorney because it
seems to limit his power. However, a closer inspection reveals that
this decision allows the district attorney to continue to exercise a wide
range of discretionary power, without having to formulate any objec-
tive standards for these acts. Instead, the district attorney is free to
point to the objective standards in Hammersley as the standard by
which the acts of the district attorney will be judged. 92 The pro-
blem is that these objective standards that the Lovvorn court
claimed were articulated in Hammersley are not that clear, and
they are no where elucidated in Lovvorn. The result is a weaken-
87. State v. Lovvorn, 691 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (interpreting State v.
Hammersley, 650 S.W.2d 352 (Tenn. 1983)).
88. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-15-101 to -106 (1982).
89. State v. Lovvorn, 691 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985).
90. Id. at 578.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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ing of the Hammersley decision, and a concomitant increase in
the discretionary power enjoyed by the district attorney.
Lovvorn is a step in the right direction insofar as it upholds the
discretionary power of the district attorney, thereby preserving some
of the effectiveness of the Tennessee Pretrial Diversion statute. How-
ever, it falls short of the action needed to give the statute the teeth
necessary to carry out effective pretrial diversion programs.
In Ohio, there is at least one case in which the prosecutor ap-
pealed from a sua sponte ruling of a Municipal Court referring the
defendant to a pretrial diversion program. 93 City of Cleveland v.
Mosquito differs from each of the cases discussed above because
the prosecutor's power was not under review. Instead, the pros-
ecutor was attempting to regain discretionary powers seemingly
lost in a lower court. The court held that timely objection by the
prosecutor to a referral of the defendant to a pretrial diversion pro-
gram was with good cause and should have been allowed by the
trial court.94 This would have denied the defendant an opportunity
to enter the program and escape trial. The prosecutor, nevertheless,
lost the larger battle because the court ruled that although sec-
tion 2935.36 of the Ohio Revised Code "discloses a legislative in-
tent to vest the prosecuting attorney with discretion regarding
eligibility for pretrial intervention programs, it does not outlaw
other established diversionary programs [which give such discre-
tion to the judiciary]. 95 Consequently, although the prosecutor's
decision not to divert the defendant was followed in this particular
case, the court opened the door for diversion programs in which
the discretionary power is lodged in the judiciary.
It has also been held in Ohio that a successfully completed diver-
sion contract under section 2935.36 is the equivalent of served or
probated time for offenses. 96 This provides the defendant who is
denied diversion with a further incentive to bring suit against the
prosecutor.
The Florida Supreme Court has held that a state attorney's
93. City of Cleveland v. Mosquito, 10 Ohio App. 3d 239, 461 N.E.2d 924 (1983).
94. Id. at 241, 461 N.E.2d at 927.
95. Id.
96. State v. Urvan. 4 Ohio App. 3d 151, 151, 446 N.E.2d 1161, 1162 (1982). limited in Bean
v. Bean, 14 Ohio App. 3d 358, 471 N.E.2d 785 (1983). In Urvan, the defendant was charged with
receiving stolen property. The formal charge was dropped when the defendant was placed in a
pretrial diversion program for first offenders. After successfully completing the diversion program,
the defendant was charged with grand theft in a different county. The charged offense was related
to the same events as the prior charge of receiving stolen goods, and on appeal, the defendant's
motion to dismiss the grand theft indictment on the ground of double jeopardy was upheld.
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refusal to consent to an accused's admission into a pretrial interven-
tion program is prosecutorial in nature and is not subject to judicial
review. 97 The court reasoned that "the pretrial intervention pro-
gram is merely an alternative to prosecution and should remain
in the prosecutor's discretion." 98 This decision expressly overruled
a prior Florida appellate decision 99 in which the court held that
the prosecutor's consent was not necessary to place a defendant
into a pretrial intervention program.
Similarly, the Florida Court of Appeals has held in State v.
C. C.B. l00 that deferred prosecution in a juvenile case is similar to
the pretrial intervention program established by section 944.025
of the Florida statutes. 10 1 The state brought a delinquency peti-
tion against a juvenile, and the trial court dismissed the petition
because "it would not be in the best interest of the child for the
case to be prosecuted."10 2 The state appealed. The District Court
of Appeals held that the determination of whether or not to pro-
secute is a discretionary function of the state attorney and not of
the court, and therefore reversed. 103 This indicates that prosecutors
in Florida have successfully fought off the attack on their discre-
tion and have regained much of their authority in the area of diver-
sion discretion.
The concern of this Note, however, is not with prosecutorial
discretion of the public prosecutor. Few would argue that the pros-
ecutor's power has been effectively curtailed.10 4 Rather, the focus
is how the very programs and statutes designed to discourage litiga-
tion have, in fact, spurred further litigation, regardless of the out-
come of that litigation.
B. Avoiding Increased Litigation
The natural tendency in the system is toward litigation. The
statistics alone seem to indicate that ours is one of the most litigious
societies ever. 10 5 When there is a law there will almost inevitably
be litigation relating to that law. While this is true, a law's existence
is justifiable if it benefits society despite any increased litigation
97. Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1982).
98. Id. at 654.
99. Id., overruling State v. Eash. 367 So. 2d 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
100. 465 So. 2d 1379. 1381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
101. FLA. STAT. § 944.025 (1979).
102. State v. C.C.B.. 465 So. 2d 1379, 1380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
103. Id. at 1380.
104. Goldstein, supra note 51.
105. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1. at 474.
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resulting from its implementation. However, when the benefits and
goals of a particular law become so undermined that the law is ac-
tually producing more harm than good, then one of two actions
must be taken. Either the law must be abandoned, or it must be
modified (expressly or by judicial interpretation) to give it the teeth
necessary to perform its intended function.
The goals and benefits of pretrial diversion programs have been
pointed out by this paper in detail. 10 6 Assuming the desirability
of these objectives, not the least of which includes the alleviation
of congested court calendars, the question becomes: Does pretrial
diversion have the ability to perform its intended functions? This
question can be answered affirmatively only if each prosecutor is
granted sufficient authority, by the legislatures and the courts, to
effectively implement the programs. Making the prosecutor justify
every decision of ineligibility for pretrial diversion programs will
be detrimental in the long run. The result will be procedural inef-
ficiency, harm to the victim, and chilling side effects on the discre-
tion of the prosecutor. The prosecutor should be required to pre-
sent justification for his actions in only the most egregious cases.
Challenges to selective prosecution based on invidious discrimina-
tion, for example, should be preserved. Such challenges, of course,
are preserved as a matter of constitutional law regardless of the
nature of prosecutorial discretion.
Procedural inefficiency stems from lengthy pretrial motion hear-
ings on diversion discretion that take as much, if not more, time
than the average case takes to be resolved. The most common
disposition of a felony arrest not rejected or dismissed is a plea of
guilty.'07 Bureau of Justice statistical data obtained from pro-
secutors in a number of urban jurisdictions shows that in 1979
forty-five of every hundred felony arrests ended in guilty pleas,
while only five ended in trials. The remaining dispositions (fifty
of every hundred) were rejections and dismissals. 08 Therefore, the
vast majority of cases not rejected or dismissed are dealt with by
a guilty plea and do not consume the time and resources needed
for pretrial motion hearings. Pretrial motion hearings on diversion
discretion function as a brake slowing down the normal disposi-
tion of cases.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 11-61.
107. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP-T OF JUSTICE, THE PREVALENCE OF GUILTY PLEAS (Special
Report) (Dec. 1984).
108. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARREST 1979
(1983).
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Making prosecutors constantly defend their decisions not to enter
particular defendants into pretrial diversion programs has a chill-
ing effect on the prosecutor because the prosecutor's authority is
constantly under attack both in the eyes of the courts and the
public. Political pressure on prosecutors now is abundant; l0 9 further
statutory pressure is not needed.
The victims of crime are also harmed by requiring the prosecutor
to defend every decision not to enter a particular defendant into
pretrial diversion. Victims may be put on the stand at pretrial
motion hearings and compelled to recite details of their unfortunate
experience while the opposing attorney is afforded free discovery.
This may jeopardize the victim's rights.' 10 Questions of due pro-
cess may arise and spur further litigation. Victims themselves may
seek to curtail the authority of the prosecutor to divert particular
defendants. This may lead to further questions of standing on the
part of the victims to pursue such action. The snowball effect of
this course seems evident. As the prosecutorial discretion necessary
to effectively run pretrial diversion programs is eroded by the
courts, the essence of the programs is destroyed. A good idea
designed to avoid litigation and save judicial resources will be used
to produce more litigation and deplete additional resources.
Furthermore, the demise of prosecutorial discretion fundamental
to our system of criminal justice will produce grave consequences.
An example is illustrative."' Suppose an eighteen-year-old college
freshman in Ohio decides to steal the license plates from an
automobile after he is assured by his cronies that this is standard
freshman initiation. Under Ohio law this offense is a felony of the
fourth degree,112 punishable by up to five years imprisonment and
a fine of $2,500.00.11 In such a case, depending upon the precise
circumstances, it would be advantageous to keep intact the pros-
ecutorial discretion for charging a particular crime, or diverting
109. Consider the different treatment given to defendants in the public eye. These defendants are
often treated more or less severely than they would be ordinarily as a consequence of political
pressure on the prosecutor. For example, the highly publicized United States v. DeLorean case
was greatly affected by the media. The publicity attending the case resulted in the court's issuance
of a closure order with regard to all documents in connection with the criminal proceeding. United
States v. DeLorean, 561 F. Supp. 797 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
110. There are many issues regarding victim's rights that are beyond the scope of this Note. For
an introduction into the rights of a victim see ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR FAIR
TREATMENT OF CRIME VICTIMS AND WITNESSES (1983).
111. This example is actually a variation of a real case. Interview with Craig R. Mayton. Super-
vising Attorney, Clinical Programs, Ohio State University College of Law (February 4. 1985).
112. OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. § 2913.71 (Page 1982).
113. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.11 (Page 1982).
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into a pretrial diversion program. Prosecutorial discretion gives the
system flexibility that would not otherwise be present. Even if one
retorts by noting that in this case the judge does not have to im-
pose the maximum sentence, a felony on a person's record will
impose serious consequences that will be felt for life. Further, the
flexibility at the decision-to-prosecute level, rather than at the
sentencing level, reduces the congested court dockets and
preserves the finite judicial resources needed to eradicate more
serious offenses.
Therefore, the path taken by the Supreme Court of Florida in
the case of Cleveland v. State1 4 is commendable. The court held
that the state attorney's decision to refuse to consent to the ac-
cused's admission to a pretrial intervention program was pros-
ecutorial in nature and not subject to judicial review.115 The court
further noted that Florida's program is statutorily created" 6 and
does not expressly provide for judicial review. 1 7 This decision by
the Florida legislature to frame the statute providing for pretrial
diversion 18 in such a manner that judicial review is not expressly
provided for is to be applauded. By phrasing the statute in this
manner the legislature has taken the first step in preserving the
authority of the prosecutor and the prosecutorial discretion mech-
anism. By its interpretation of this legislation, the Supreme Court
of Florida has taken the second step necessary to preserve the
discretion of the prosecutor.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is not the intent of this Note to canvass all jurisdictions search-
ing for litigation based upon the assertion of a "right" to pretrial
diversion and a prosecutor's discretionary abrogation of that right.
Rather, the intention here is to point out some newly litigated
issues. This new source of litigation is noteworthy because it is
based on an attempt to avoid litigation. 19 The use of pretrial diver-
114. 417 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1982).
115. Id. at 654.
116. FLA. STAT. § 944.025 (1985).
117. Cleveland v. State, 417 So. 2d 653. 654 (Fla. 1982).
118. The Florida statute is entitled "Pretrial Intervention Programs." FLA. STAT. § 944.025 (1979).
119. It is important to realize that this Note was focused on only one way the concept of pretrial
diversion Is used to Incite litigation: using the given program and statute to check the unfettered
discretion of the prosecutor. There are other issues involving questions of constitutionality and
standing that have also spurred litigation and promise to do so in the future. These issues are often
intermingled in the cases concerning a specific diversion program and statute. See generally Sledge
v. Superior Court. 520 P.2d 412, 113 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1974); State v. Greenlee, 228 Kan. 712, 620
P.2d 1132 (1980); State v. Lamphere, 159 N.J. Super. 562, 388 A.2d 998 (1978); State ex. rel.
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sion statutes and programs to check the discretion of the prosecutor
produces an anomaly that results in procedural inefficiency, harm
to the victim, and chilling side effects on the discretion of the
prosecutor.
Cases can be found concerning the diversion of various applicants
in which the discretion of the prosecutor has been upheld, and deci-
sions in which the discretion of the prosecutor have been overruled
or curtailed. 120 The important point is not the outcome of individual
cases but the fact that litigation in this area is occurring and will
continue. To curtail the advent of this new class of litigation, pros-
ecutors must be given a free reign in deciding which candidates
are suitable for entrance into pretrial diversion programs. The
Supreme Court of Florida in Cleveland v. State'2' has led the way
in allowing this discretion. Only in the most egregious case of a
clear abuse of prosecutorial discretion should the prosecutor be
required to defend the decision not to allow a particular individual
to enter a pretrial diversion program.
Harmon v. Blanding, 292 Or. 752, 644 P.2d 1082 (1982); Commonwealth v. Kindness. 371 A.2d
1346 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977); State ex. rel. Schillberg v. Cascade Dist. Ct. 94 Wash. 2d 772, 621 P.2d
115 (1980).
120. See Annot.. 4 A.L.R. 4th 147, 166-80 (1981).
121. 417 So. 2d. 653 (Fla. 1982).
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